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1 Introduction
Many microeconomic decisions are lumpy in nature. Caballero and Engel (2007)
note that examples include not only infrequent price adjustment by rms but also
investment decisions, durable purchases, hiring and ring decisions, inventory ac-
cumulation, and many other economic variables of interest. We develop a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) framework featuring sticky prices combined
with monopolistic competition and lumpy investment. In this way we integrate the
New Keynesian (NK) framework, which is the workhorse of current monetary policy
analysis, with the dominant approach of the recent micro-founded investment liter-
ature. The combination of these two literatures allows us to address the following
question. Do NK models still deliver a quantitatively relevant monetary transmis-
sion mechanism1 when they are augmented by a standard micro-founded investment
model? Surprisingly, our answer is no. Let us put this result into perspective. Tra-
ditionally, capital accumulation has been ignored in NK theory.2 Woodford (2003,
p. 352) comments on this modeling choice: [...] while this has kept the analysis of
the e¤ects of interest rates on aggregate demand quite simple, one may doubt the
accuracy of the conclusions obtained, given the obvious importance of variations in
investment spending both in business uctuations generally and in the transmission
mechanism for monetary policy in particular.By now, prominent treatments of the
monetary transmission mechanism do feature endogenous capital accumulation (see,
e.g., Christiano et al. 2005 and Woodford 2005). We observe, however, that those
models simply brush away the lumpy nature of plant level investment. More impor-
tantly, our main result shows that this is crucial for the ability of monetary DSGE
models to generate a quantitatively relevant monetary transmisson mechanism.
We assume stochastic xed adjustment costs for both price-setting and invest-
ment. This way of modeling state-dependent decisions in the context of general
equilibrium analyses has been employed both in monetary economics (see, e.g., Dot-
sey et al. 1999) and in the lumpy investment literature (see, e.g., Thomas 2002 and
Khan and Thomas 2008). Under the baseline calibration we nd that the impact
responses of investment and output to monetary policy shocks are way too large and
that there is essentially no persistence. How does this result change in the presence
1The monetary transmission mechanism is generally viewed as being the hallmark of monetary
economics. See, e.g., Woodford (2003, p. 6) and Galí (2008, p. 1).
2See, e.g., Clarida et al. (1999).
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of Calvo (1983) pricing? In that case the impact responses of real variables to a
monetary policy shock become even larger and there is essentially no gain in terms
of persistence. We also show that there exist specications of the price adjustment
cost for which the impact responses of the real variables are reduced with respect
to our baseline calibration but in no case do we nd persistent e¤ects of monetary
policy shocks or a realistic split of output between investment and consumption.
Taken together our main result therefore suggests that the presence of an empir-
ically plausible investment decision at the rm level casts doubt on the ability of
sticky prices to imply a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism.
The (S,s) nature of investment decisions is the crucial to understand this result.
In response to an expansionary monetary policy shock rms choose to undertake
some of the investment activity that they would have otherwise done later. This
is important for two reasons. First, the impact investment response to the shock
becomes very large. Second, the distribution of rms in the economy is altered in
such a way that investment in subsequent periods is reduced. This explains both
the enormous size of the impact response of investment to a monetary disturbance
(which is driving the large output responses) and the almost complete lack of per-
sistence in the dynamic consequences of that shock. Finally, the di¤erence in results
between (S,s) pricing and price-setting à la Calvo is a consequence of an extensive
margin e¤ect, as analyzed in Caballero and Engle (2007).
The technical di¢ culties implied by simultaneous (S,s) decision making in the
context of a general equilibrium model are quite substantial. This explains why
most existing theoretical analyses in the related literature have focused on one par-
ticular lumpy decision at a time. For instance, Thomas (2002), Gourio and Kashyap
(2007), Bachmann et al. (2008) and Khan and Thomas (2008) analyze aggregate
consequences of lumpy investment in the context of RBC models, whereas Dotsey et
al. (1999), Dotsey and King (2005), Midrigan (2006), Bakhshi et al. (2007), Golosov
and Lucas (2007), Dotsey et al. (2008), Gertler and Leahy (2008), and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) focus exclusively on the role of state-dependent pricing for
aggregate dynamics. We overcome those di¢ culties by using the method developed
in Reiter (2008, 2009). Another paper which integrates (S,s) pricing and investment
decisions in general equilibrium is Johnston (2008).3 We regard his work as comple-
3Kryvtsov and Midrigan (2009) integrate pricing and inventory decisions in the context of a
menu cost model. They use their model to analyze the behavior of inventories in the aftermath of
monetary policy shocks.
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mentary to ours. He assumes a stationary process for the growth rate of real balances
(combined with an interest rate inelastic demand for real balances), whereas we con-
sider an interest rate rule for the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover Johnston
(2008) ensures tractability of his framework by making assumptions which limit the
extent to which the timing of pricing decisions is chosen optimally.4 Our model is
therefore not nested with his framework. Johnston (2008) nds that the presence
of lumpy investment lowers somewhat the persistence in the real consequences of
monetary disturbances (with respect to a version of his model in which capital is
endogenous but not lumpy). Our analysis shows, however, that the consequences of
lumpy investment are dramatic in an economic environment that is otherwise closer
to standard textbook treatments of the monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model.
Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nancial markets. The
representative household has the following period utility function
U (Ct; Lt) = lnCt +

1   (1  Lt)
1  ;
which is separable in its two arguments Ct and Lt. The former denotes a Dixit-
Stiglitz consumption aggregate while the latter is meant to indicate hours worked.
Our notation reects that a households time endowment is normalized to one per
period and throughout the analysis the subscript t is used to indicate that a variable
is dated as of that period. The inverse of the steady state labor supply elasticity is
given by L
1 L and we adopt the convention that a variable without time subscript
indicates its steady state value. Parameter  is a scaling parameter whose role will
be discussed below. The consumption aggregate reads
Ct 
Z 1
0
Ct (i)
 1
 di
 
 1
; (1)
4Specically, he assumes that if a rm wants to adjust its capital, it must also adjust its price. In
addition he assumes that capital is installed and becomes productive immediately after purchase.
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where  is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of goods Ct (i).
The associated price index is dened as follows
Pt 
Z 1
0
Pt (i)
1  di
 1
1 
; (2)
where Pt (i) is the price of good i. Requiring optimal allocation of any spending on
the available goods implies that consumption expenditure can be written as PtCt.
Households are assumed to maximize expected discounted utility
Et
1X
k=0
kU (Ct+k; Lt+k) ;
where  is the subjective discount factor. The maximization is subject to a sequence
of budget constraints of the form
PtCt + Et fQt;t+1Dt+1g  Dt + PtWtLt + Tt; (3)
where Qt;t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor for random nominal payments
and Dt+1 gives the nominal payo¤ associated with the portfolio held at the end of
period t. We have also used the notation Wt for the real wage and Tt is nominal
dividend income resulting from ownership of rms.
The labor supply equation implied by this structure takes the standard form
 Ct (1  Lt)  = Wt; (4)
and the consumer Euler equation is given by
QRt;t+1 = 

Ct+1
Ct
 1
; (5)
where QRt;t+1  Qt;t+1t+1 is the real stochastic discount factor, and t+1  Pt+1Pt is
the gross rate of ination between periods t and t+1. We also note that Et fQt;t+1g =
R 1t , where Rt is the gross risk free nominal interest rate.
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2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of rms and each of them is the monopolistically competitive
producer of a di¤erentiated good. Each rm i 2 [0; 1] is assumed to maximize its
market value subject to constraints implied by the demand for its good and the
production technology it has access to. Moreover each rm faces random xed costs
of price and capital adjustment. This implies generalized (S; s) rules for price-setting
and for investment. The central question of the present paper regards the monetary
transmission mechanism. Monetary policy shocks are therefore assumed to be the
only source of aggregate uncertainty. In each period the time line is as follows.
1. The cost of adjusting the price as well as the monetary policy shock realize.
2. The rm changes its price (or not).
3. Production takes place.
4. The cost of adjusting the capital stock realizes.
5. The rm invests (or not).
Let us now be more specic about the above mentioned constraints. Each rm
i has access to the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt (i) = Lt (i)
L Kt (i)
K ; (6)
where L and K denote the shares of labor and capital in production. In order to
invest or to change its price a rm must pay a xed cost. More precisely, we denote
the cost functions for investment and for price-setting by Ck;t (i) and Cp;t (i). They
are both measured in units of the aggregate good and are given by
Ck;t (Kt (i) ; Kt+1 (i) ; ck) =
(
Kt (i) if Kt+1 (i) = (1  )Kt (i) ;
Kt+1 (i)  (1     )Kt (i) + ck otherwise.
(7)
Cp;t (Pt (i) ; Pt+1 (i) ; cp) =
(
0 if Pt+1 (i) = Pt (i) ;
cp otherwise.
(8)
The realizations of the capital and price adjustment costs are denoted ck and cp,
respectively, and  is the rate of depreciation net of maintenance, . The cost distri-
bution functions are assumed to take the general form G () = c1+c2 tan (c3   c4) ;
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which is parametrized by c1, c2, c3 and c4. For the price adjustment cost we follow
Dotsey et al. (1999) in assuming an inverted S-shaped distribution, whereas we
assume a linear distribution function for capital adjustment costs, which is a con-
ventional choice in that literature (see, e.g., Thomas 2002 and Khan and Thomas
2008).5
Cost-minimization on the part of households and rms implies that demand for
good i is given by
Y dt (i) =

Pt (i)
Pt
 
Y dt ; (9)
where aggregate demand is Y dt = Ct + It + Cp;t, which consists of consumption,
aggregate investment, It 
R 1
0
Ck;t (i) di, and aggregate price-setting costs, Cp;t =R 1
0
Cp;t (i) di.
Each rm maximizes its market value
Et
1X
k=0
QRt;t+k f	t+k (i)  Ck;t+k (i)  Cp;t+k (i)   Wt+kg ; (10)
where 	t (i)  Pt(i)Pt Yt (i)  WtL (i) is the gross operating surplus, and  denotes a
xed cost which is measured in units of labor and whose role will be explained when
we discuss our calibration. The maximization is done subject to the constraints in
equations (6), (7), (8) and (9).
2.3 Market Clearing and Monetary Policy
The goods market clearing condition reads
Yt (i) = Y
d
t (i) for all i. (11)
Clearing of the labor market requires
1Z
0
[Lt (i) + ] di = Lt. (12)
5The parameter values for the adjustment cost distribution functions are calibrated as follows:
Inverted S-shaped distribution: c3 = 438:4=Bp; c4 = 1:26 and for the linear distribution: c3 =
150:9=Bk and c4 = 0:3, where Bp = 0:00467 and Bk = 0:0115 are the respective upper bounds.
They are chosen to target some empirical regularities on capital adjustment and price-setting at
the rm level. We will come back to this. Finally, parameters c1 and c2 are chosen in each case to
guarantee that G (0) = 0 and G (Bj) = 1, whith j 2 fp; kg.
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To close the model we assume a Taylor-type rule for the conduct of monetary policy
Rt = (Rt 1)
r
"



t

 Yt
Y
y#1 r
eer;t : (13)
Parameters  and y are meant to indicate the long-run responsiveness of the
nominal interest rate to changes in current ination and output,6 respectively, and
and r measures interest rate smoothing. The shock to monetary policy, er;t, is i.i.d.
with zero mean.
2.4 Baseline Calibration
We consider a quarterly model. The discount factor, , is set to 0:99, which implies
an annualized steady state real interest rate of about 4 percent. Annualized steady
state ination is set to 2 percent. Parameter  is set to imply that households spend
one-third of their available time working. Combined with  = 2 this implies a unit
labor supply elasticity in the steady state. We follow Golosov and Lucas (2007) in
assuming a value of 7 for the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent varieties of
goods, , which implies a desired frictionless markup of about 20 percent. Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2006) estimate the curvature in the relationship between a rms
period prot and its capital stock. We therefore impose that the concavity of the
prot function in a frictionless version of our model7 is 0:592, which is in line with
their estimate. We also require that our model implies a labor share of 0:64 and a
yearly capital-to-output ratio of 2:352 (see, e.g., Khan and Thomas 2008). The last
three empirical values are targeted by our choice of the technology parameters L
and K as well as the xed cost . The rate of depreciation (gross of maintenance)
6Usually, the output gap, i.e., the ratio between equilibrium output and natural output (dened
as the equilibrium output under exible prices) enters the specication of monetary policy. Notice,
however, that natural output does not change in response to a monetary disturbance.
7Consider a rms gross operating surplus, 	(i), in the exible-price counterpart of our model.
Invoking the demand function combined with the production function, we can write:
	(K (i)) = max
L(i)
n
[K (i)
K L (i)
L ]
1
 Y 1 
1
  WL (i)
o
:
Using the rst-order condition to substitute for L (i) gives
	(K (i)) = K (i)

;
where  is a constant and   K L is the curvature estimated in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
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is set to  +  = 0:025 which implies a steady state investment to capital ratio of
10 percent a year. We allow for 33 percent maintenance, i.e., we set  to 0:025=3.
This value is well in line with the empirical evidence reported in Bachmann et
al. (2008) and the references therein. The upper bounds of the cost distribution
functions are set such that our model is in line with the following micro evidence.
Each quarter about 25 percent of rms change their price (see, e.g., Aucremanne
and Dhyne 2004, Baudry et al. 2004, and Nakamura and Steinsson 2008) and each
year about 18 percent of rms make lumpy investments (i.e., I=K > 20 percent).
Those investments account for about 50 percent of aggregate investment (see, e.g.,
Khan and Thomas 2008). To specify monetary policy we set  = 1:5; y = 0:5=4
and r = 0:7.
2.5 Numerical Method
A detailed description of our numerical method is provided in the Appendix, based
on Reiter (2008, 2009). The solution provided is fully nonlinear in the individual
optimization problem, but linearized in the aggregate variables, which include the
cross-sectional distribution of capital and prices. Aggregate uctuations are (in-
nitesimally) small perturbations around a steady state without aggregate shocks.
Notice that we treat the pricing decision of the rm as a continuous choice, but the
capital choice as discrete. This implies that, for a rm with given level of capital and
price, innitesimally small aggregate shocks only a¤ect the probability of investing,
not the discrete size of the investment. This modeling choice is motivated by the
empirical fact that capital adjustment takes place mostly at the extensive margin, as
documented by Cooper et al. (1999) and the references therein and, more recently,
Gourio and Kashyap (2007). Notice, however, that aggregate shocks also change
the distribution of capital and prices across rms, and thereby inuence the average
size of investment through a composition e¤ect.
3 Results
3.1 Steady State
Let us start by analyzing how the interaction of (S,s) pricing and investment de-
cisions a¤ects the stochastic steady state of our model. To this end it is useful to
8
introduce one friction at a time. First, we assume that investment is lumpy but
that prices are fully exible. The implied ergodic set is illustrated in Figure 1. The
size of each point in Figures 1, 2 and 3 indicates the associated probability mass,
expressed as a fraction of the largest point mass in the ergodic set.
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Figure 1: Ergodic Set for Flexible-Price Model.
Figure 1 shows that rms with a relatively large capital stock choose a relatively
small price. This is intuitive. With exible prices a rm implements the desired
markup over its marginal cost period by period and a rms marginal cost is inversely
related to the size of its capital stock. Moreover, all investors choose the same capital
9
stock (regardless of the relative price that is in place by the time when the investment
decision is made). This is another intuitive nding since the restriction on capital
adjustment is the only source of heterogeneity in this simplied version of our model.
Next, we turn to the baseline calibration. The lower panel of Figure 2 illustrates
the behavior of price-setters in the ergodic set.
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Figure 2: Newly Chosen Capital Stocks and Prices.
Once again a clear pattern emerges. The larger a rms capital stock the smaller
the chosen relative price. There are, however, some important di¤erences with
respect to the exible price version of our model. For large enough capital stocks
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the chosen prices are larger than their counterparts under exible prices whereas
the opposite is true at lower capital levels. The reason is as follows. To the extent
that prices are sticky they are set in a forward-looking manner. Specically, a rm
takes rationally into account that its relative price will decrease over time (due to
steady state ination) as long as it is not reset. In addition the rms capital stock
is expected to depreciate over the lifetime of the chosen price if no investment is
expected to occur. Those considerations make price-setters with relatively large
capital stocks choose prices that are larger than the ones that rms with the same
capital stocks would choose in the presence of exible prices. If a price-setters
capital stock is, however, smaller then it becomes more likely that an investment
will take place before the price is reset. That is taken into account when price-
setters form expectations regarding their marginal costs over the lifetimes of the
chosen prices. This explains why newly set prices that are chosen by rms with
relatively small capital stocks are smaller than the corresponding exible prices.
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the newly chosen capital stocks. For large
enough relative prices the chosen capital stock is a decreasing function of a rms
relative price. However, for lower relative prices this relationship becomes backward-
bending. The reason is as follows. The smaller an investors price the likelier it is
that this rm will increase its price over the expected lifetime of the chosen capital
stock. This in turn limits the size of the capital adjustment that the rm undertakes.
Notice that the relationship between relative prices and newly chosen capital stocks
is not backward-bending for larger values of relative prices. The combined e¤ect of
depreciation and steady state ination makes it unlikely that a rm would choose to
incur a price adjustment cost in order to decrease its price over the expected lifetime
of the chosen capital stock. With those preparations we now turn to the ergodic set
implied by our baseline calibration. This is shown in Figure 3.
11
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Figure 3: Ergodic Set for the Baseline Model.
There are many di¤erent groups of rms as a consequence of the interaction
of pricing and investment decisions. We have already discussed the subsets of the
ergodic set that correspond to newly set prices and newly chosen capital stocks.
If a rm does not adjust neither its price nor its capital stock for the next period
then that rm moves down and to the left in the gure due to the e¤ects of steady
state ination and depreciation. This is reected in the lines that are parallel to the
ones which correspond to the optimally chosen prices and capital stocks. Finally,
the gure also documents that price-setting occurs more frequently than investment
under our baseline calibration. In fact, the lowest capital levels that are visited
12
in the ergodic set are reached because rms nd it optimal to let their capital
depreciate over extended periods if they increase their prices from time to time in
the meanwhile.
Having analyzed some important steady state properties of our model we now
turn to the central question of the present paper. Does New Keynesian theory imply
a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism?
3.2 The Monetary Transmission Mechanism
We consider rst a simplied version of our model which is closely related to standard
textbook treatments of the monetary transmission mechanism. This will allow us
to highlight important di¤erences with respect to the predictions of our baseline
model. Specically, it is assumed that capital is constant at the rm level and that
prices are set in a time-dependent fashion à la Calvo (1983), i.e., each rm faces a
constant and exogenous probability of getting to reoptimize its price in any given
period. In order to be consistent with our baseline calibration this probability is set
to 0:25. The remaining parameters are held constant at their baseline values.
13
0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
4
6
8
x 10
-3 Output
0 5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
3
4
x 10
-3 Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10
-3 Real Interest Rate
Figure 4: Monetary Policy Shocks with Fixed Capital and Calvo Pricing
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamic consequences of a 100 basis point decrease in
the annualized nominal interest rate. The rate of ination as well as the real interest
rate are also annualized and each variable is measured as the log deviation of the
original variable from its steady state value. The ndings conrm empirical results
on the monetary transmission mechanism. The standard Calvo model predicts that
monetary policy shocks have strong and persistent consequences for real variables
in a way that is (at least qualitatively) consistent with the empirical evidence that
has been obtained using structural vector autoregressive methods. For instance, the
estimates reported by Christiano et al. (2005) indicate that the maximum output
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response to an identied monetary policy shock is about 0:5 percent.8 (The 95
percent condence interval about this point estimate is about +=   0:2.) After
that output is estimated to take about one and a half years to revert to its original
level which is in line with the models prediction. The standard Calvo model is
also consistent with the observed inertial behavior of ination, and the maximum
ination response lies in the empirically plausible range.9 Finally, the nominal in-
terest rate takes about two quarters to return half-way to its preshock level which
is another feature of the standard model that is in line with the estimates reported
in Christiano et al. (2005).
How does the monetary transmission mechanism change when the New Keyne-
sian model is augmented by a micro-founded investment model? We will analyze
this question under alternative assumptions regarding the price-setting of rms. It
is is natural to start with the baseline version of our model, and once again we con-
sider dynamic consequences of a one hundred basis point decrease in the annualized
nominal interest rate. Figure 5 illustrates our main result.
8The maximum response is estimated to occur about six quarters after the shock. This is one
reason why additional real and nominal frictions are typically added to New Keynesian models in
order to increase their empirical realism. See, e.g., Christiano et al. (2005).
9Christiano et al. (2005) estimate a maximum ination response of roughly 0:2 percent which
occurs about two years after the shock. (The 95 percent condence interval about this point
estimate is about +=  0:15.)
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Figure 5: Monetary Policy Shocks with Lumpy Investment and Sticky Prices
Under the baseline calibration monetary policy shocks do not imply empirically
plausible e¤ects on real variables. Specically, our model predicts an impact response
of output to the monetary disturbance of about 1:5 percent, i.e., about twice as
much as in the constant capital case. Moreover the presence of lumpy investment
results in a dramatic reduction of the persistence in the dynamic consequences of
monetary policy shocks. Finally, the relative size of the investment response to
the monetary policy shock compared to the consumption response is not plausible.
Christiano et al. (2005) estimate a maximum investment response of about one
percent and a maximum consumption response of roughly 0:2 percent, whereas our
baseline model perdicts that the corresponding numbers are about 10 percent and
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0:15 percent, respectively. Finally, the impact ination response predicted by our
baseline model is about ve times larger than the estimated maximum response in
the data. Those ndings are in stark contrast with the empirical evidence. Figure
5 also shows that the theoretical results are even less in line with the data if Calvo
pricing is assumed in the context of our lumpy investment model. In that case
the impact response of output to a monetary policy shock is even stronger at a
value of about 3 percent. Moreover there is still an implausible lack of persistence
and both the investment and the consumption response to the monetary policy
shock are unrealistically large. In a way that is consistent with the stronger impact
responses of the real variables to the monetary disturbance we also nd that the
impact ination response is much smaller under Calvo pricing, and better in line
with the estimated maximum response.10 Taken together those results suggest that
the presence of a micro-founded investment decision casts doubt on the ability of
sticky prices to imply a quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism
in the context of otherwise standard versions of the New Keynesian model.
Let us explain the economic mechanism behind our results. If investment deci-
sions are conducted in an (S,s) fashion then rms choose the timing of those decisions
optimally. They therefore tend to front-load investment decisions by the time when
a monetary policy shock hits the economy. In other words, rms take rationally into
account that the decrease in the real interest rate that is triggered by the monetary
policy shock makes it particularly protable for them to invest by the time when
the shock hits the economy. They therefore undertake some of the investment ac-
tivity that they would have otherwise done later. This is important for two reasons.
First, the impact investment response to the shock becomes very large. Second,
the distribution of rms in the economy is altered in such a way that investment
in subsequent periods becomes less likely. This explains both the enormous size of
the impact response of investment to a monetary disturbance (which is driving the
large output responses) and the almost complete lack of persistence in the dynamic
consequences of that shock. But what is the reason behind the additional exibility
of ination that is implied by (S,s) pricing compared to the Calvo model? Caballero
and Engle (2007) argue forcefully that the answer to that question is an extensive
margin e¤ect, i.e., the fact that some rms increase their prices in response to an
expansionary monetary policy shock precisely because the monetary disturbance
10However, the fact that ination reverts to its steady state level from below is another unrealistic
prediction of this version of the model.
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makes them reach the threshold for upward adjustment. In the Calvo model this
e¤ect is absent. Those rms which face an innitely large adjustment cost will not
respond to the monetary disturbance and the remaining rms would also adjust if
there was no shock because this is costless for them. If the cost distribution is,
however, changed in such a way that the probability mass is concentrated around
intermediate values then the fraction of rms facing costs that are too extreme to
make the monetary disturbance trigger a price increase becomes smaller. In other
words, the extensive margin e¤ect becomes stronger. This is the reason why ina-
tion reacts more to a monetary policy shock if the price cost distribution is changed
from Calvo to baseline, and the real consequences of monetary disturbances are
consequently smaller in the baseline case. This intuition is conrmed if we analyze
the monetary transmission mechanism under two alternative forms of the price ad-
justment cost density: uniform and triangular.11 The results are shown in Figure
6.
11In each case the upper bound of the support is chosen in such a way that the average frequency
of price adjustment is 0:25, as in our baseline model.
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Figure 6: Monetary Policy Shocks with Lumpy Investment and Alternative Price
Adjustment Cost Distributions.
In each case the impact response of output is reduced with respect to our base-
line specication. Under the uniform cost density it takes a value of about 1 percent
whereas the corresponding number under the triangular specication is less than
0:5 percent. At the same time, however, persistence in the dynamic consequences
of monetary disturbances is further reduced, the relative size of the investment re-
sponse compared to the consumption response is again implausible, and the ination
response to the shock is unrealistically large.
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4 Conclusion
The lumpy nature of plant-level investment is generally not taken into account in
the context of monetary theory (see, e.g., Christiano et al. 2005, Woodford 2005).
We propose a generalized (S,s) pricing and investment model which is empirically
more plausible along that dimension. Surprisingly, our main result shows that a
quantitatively relevant monetary transmission mechanism is hard to entertain in
the presence of lumpy investment. In fact, neither state-dependent pricing nor time-
dependent price-setting à la Calvo can generate dynamic consequences of monetary
policy shocks that are consistent with their counterpart in the data. Does this mean
that an explanation for the empirical e¤ects of monetary policy shocks must be
found elsewhere? Not necessarily. The results presented in the present paper hinge
crucially on the (S,s) nature of the investment decisions under consideration. In fact,
the monetary transmission mechanism is well and alive if pricing and investment
decisions are modeled in a time-dependent fashion, as shown in Sveen and Weinke
(2007).12 Put into this perspective our results simply suggest that the feature of
endogenous capital accumulation did not receive su¢ ciently much attention in the
context of monetary models. Following up on the issues raised in the present paper
will therefore be high on our research agenda. In particular, it would be interesting to
see how the addition of other empirically plausible features of plant-level investment,
such as time-to-build, would a¤ect the results presented here.
12Specically, Sveen and Weinke (2007) obtain the following equivalence result. If pricing and
lumpy investment decisions are made in a time-dependent fashion then a convex capital adjustment
cost at the rm-level à la Woodford (2005) is observationally equivalent to its counterpart featuring
lumpy investment.
20
References
Aucremanne, Luc, and Emmanuel Dhyne (2004), How Frequently Do Prices Change?
Evidence based on the micro data underlying the Belgian CPI, European Central
Bank Working Paper No. 331.
Bachmann, Ruediger, Ricardo J. Caballero, and Eduardo R.M.A. Engel (2006),
Aggregate Implications of Lumpy Investment: New Evidence and a DSGE Model,
NBER Working Paper 12336.
Bakhshi, Hasan, Hashmat Khan, and Barbara Rudolf (2007), The Phillips Curve
under State-Dependent Pricing, Journal of Monetary Economics 54(8), 2321-2345.
Baudry, Laurent, Hervé Le Bihan, Patrick Sevestre, and Sylvie Tarrieu (2004),
Price Rigidity. Evidence from the French CPI Micro-Data, European Central
Bank Working Paper No. 384.
Caballero, Ricardo J., and Eduardo R.M.A. Engel (2007), Price Stickiness in Ss
Models: New Interpretations of Old Results, Journal of Monetary Economics 54S,
100121.
Calvo, Guillermo (1983): Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework,
Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3), 383-398.
Christiano, Lawrence J., Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles L. Evans (2005), Nom-
inal Rigidities and the Dynamic E¤ects of a Shock to Monetary Policy, Journal of
Political Economy 113(1), 1-45.
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler (1999): The Science of Monetary
Policy: a New Keynesian Perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4), 1661-
1707.
Cooper, Russell W., John C. Haltiwanger, and Laura Power (1999), Machine Re-
placement and the Business Cycle: Lumps and Bumps, American Economic Review
89(4), 921946.
Cooper, Russell W., and John C. Haltiwanger (2006), On the Nature of Capital
Adjustment Costs, Review of Economic Studies 73(3), 611633.
Dotsey, Michael, and Robert G. King (2005), Implications of State-Dependent Pric-
ing for Dynamic Macroeconomic Models, Journal of Monetary Economics 52(1),
213-242.
21
Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L.Wolman (1999), State-Dependent
Pricing and the General Equilibrium Dynamics of Money and Output, The Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 114(2), 655-690.
Dotsey, Michael, Robert G. King, and Alexander L. Wolman (2008), Ination and
Real Activity with Firm-Level Productivity Shocks: A Quantitative Framework,
mimeo.
Galí, Jordi (2008), Monetary Policy, Ination, and the Business Cycle: An Intro-
duction to the New Keynesian Framework, Princeton University Press.
Gertler, Mark and John Leahy (2008), A Phillips Curve with an Ss Foundation,
Journal of Political Economy 116(3), 533-572.
Golosov, Mikhail, and Robert E. Lucas Jr.(2007), Menu Costs and Phillips Curves,
Journal of Political Economy 115(2), 171-199.
Gourio, François., Anil K. Kashyap (2007), Investment spikes: new facts and a
general equilibrium exploration, Journal of Monetary Economics 54S, 1-22.
Johnston, Michael K. (2008), Real and Nominal Frictions within the Firm: How
Lumpy Investment Matters for Price Adjustment, mimeo, Bank of Canada.
Khan, Aubhik, and Julia K. Thomas (2008), Idiosyncratic Shocks and the Role of
Nonconvexities in Plant and Aggregate Investment Dynamics, Econometrica 76(2),
395-436.
Krusell, Per, and Anthony A. Smith, Jr. (1998) Income and Wealth Heterogeneity
in the Macroeconomy, Journal of Political Economy 106(5), 867-896.
Kryvtsov, Oleksiy, and Virgiliu Midrigan (2009), Inventories, Markups, and Real
Rigidities in Menu Cost Models, Bank of Canada Working Paper 2009-6.
Midrigan, Virgiliu (2006), Menu Costs, Multi-Product Firms, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations, mimeo.
Nakamura, Emi, and Jon Steinsson (2008), Five Facts About Prices: A Reevalua-
tion of Menu Cost Models, forthcoming The Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Reiter, Michael (2008), Solving heterogeneous-agent models by projection and per-
turbation, forthcoming Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
Reiter, Michael (2009), Approximate Aggregation in Heterogeneous-Agent Mod-
els, mimeo, IHS Vienna.
22
Sveen, Tommy, and Lutz Weinke (2007), Lumpy Investment, Sticky Prices, and the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Journal of Monetary Economics 54S, 23-36.
Thomas, Julia K. (2002), Is Lumpy Investment Relevant for the Business Cycle?,
Journal of Political Economy 110(3), 508-534.
Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Mone-
tary Policy, Princeton University Press.
Woodford, Michael (2005), Firm-Specic Capital and the New-Keynesian Phillips
Curve, International Journal of Central Banking 1(2), 1-46.
23
Appendix: Numerical Method
Each rm, indexed by i, has two individual state variables, capital K(i) and last
periods price P (i). For the numerical solution, we discretize the state space by
choosing a discrete rectangular grid in the log of K(i) and in the log of the rms
relative price p (i)  P (i) =P . The grid is centered around the steady state values
of those variables. The distance between grid points in log(K)-direction equals
m log(1  ) for some integer m, such that a rm which does not adjust its capital
stock just moves m steps down the grid. The grid in log(p) is not a multiple of
the ination rate. If a rm that starts at a point of the grid and does not adjust
its price, then it moves down the grid by the equivalent of the ination rate, and
would therefore end up inbetween grid points. To stay on the discrete grid, we
approximate this situation by assuming that the price jumps stochastically to one
of the two neighboring grid points, such that the expected price does not change.
Solving for the steady state is a two-dimensional xed point problem in aggregate
demand Y and wage rateW . Given a guess of Y andW , we solve the rms problem
by the following iterative procedure:
1. Assume we have a guess of the rm value function V (k; p). The rm then
maximizes its value, dened as current period prots plus the discounted con-
tinuation value V (k; p). Then we compute optimal choices, conditional on
adjusting, as follows:
 In the second part of each period, the rm chooses next periods k.
Choices are discrete, restricted to the points on the discrete grid. Since
adjustment costs are independent of adjustment size, the optimal capital
is only a function of the price set by the rm, not its current k. The
chosen capital stock enters into next periods production.
 In the rst part of each period, the rm chooses the price at which it
sells its product in that same period. We rst nd the optimal p on the
discrete grid; assume it is the i-th point pi. Then we assume the rm
chooses the price continuously in the range (pi 1; pi+1). Call the optimal
price p, which is a function of rm capital k, and will in general not be
on the discrete grid. For the prot maximization, we assume that the
rm sells at p this period, but next period the price jumps stochastically
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to neighbouring grid points, so as to leave the expected price unchanged.
Given optimal choices, the adjustment probabilities are a function of the
distribution of the adjustment costs.
2. Given a rm policy (i.e., optimal choices of k and p), we can compute a new
guess of the value function V (k; p) under the assumption that the policy is
played forever. This is just a linear equation system in V .
Iterate steps 1. and 2. until convergence; this is a standard iteration in policy
space, for which convergence can be proven. Given equilibrium adjustment proba-
bilities, we can compute the ergodic distribution of k and p, and see whether they
are consistent with the guesses of Y and W . We solve for equilibrum Y and W by
a quasi-Newton method.
Having computed the steady state, we compute the dynamics, assuming (inni-
tesimally) small shocks. We can restrict attention to the ergodic set of (k; p)-points
in the steady state. With our choices for the dynamics of k and p, innitesimally
small shocks would not move the economy away from the ergodic set. Assume the
ergodic set consists of n points x1; : : : ; xn, where each x is a (k; p)-pair from the
grid. At each point in time, the state vector which describes the physical state of
the economy is then given by (r;(x1);(x2); : : : ;(xn)) where  (xi) is the mass
of rms at point xi, and r is the nominal interest rate. The nominal interest rate
is a state variable because the monetary authority attempts to smooth the interest
rate over time. The vector of jump variables includes the value function at grid
points V (xi) ; i = 1; : : : ; n and other aggregate variables of interest (output etc.).
We stack all the state variables plus the jump variables into the vector t. Finally,
we compute a linear approximation of the dynamics of t about the steady state of
those variables. If the dimension of t is not too big (up to around 2000 variables),
one can solve for the exact dynamics of the linearized model using the method of
Reiter (2008). Notice that this solution is linear in the aggregate variables (including
the cross-sectional distribution ), but fully nonlinear in the individual variables.
We choose a grid of 400 points in p-direction and 229 points in K-direction. In
the benchmark case, the ergodic set then has 7631 states. The vector  therefore
has around 15000 variables, and it is impossible to solve a model with this dimension
on our PC. We therefore resort to model reduction techniques described in Reiter
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(2009). The reduced model has 165 state variables and and 61 jump variables.13 In
the model with Calvo pricing, the ergodic set contains 20938 points. The reduced
model has 185 state variables and 65 jump variables. The relative error arising
from the state aggregation is in the range of 10 7. The results are not sensitive to
reasonable variations in the size of the grid.
13Papers following the tradition of Krusell and Smith (1998) approximate the model using one
or two state variables, which are typically some moments of the cross-sectional distribution. In our
model, a precise solution cannot be otained with such a low number of variables. With 165 state
variables, chosen optimally as explained in Reiter (2009), the solution is exact almost to machine
precision.
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